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In the Phaedo, to explain why the philosopher lives in the unusually ascetic way he does, Socrates 
explains what someone realizes when philosophy takes possession of his soul and how he changes 
his behavior on the basis of this information. This paper considers the conception of belief the 
character uses in this explanation and whether it is the same as the conception Michael Frede thinks 
the historical Socrates is likely to have held and that the Stoics much later incorporated into their 





I argue against the “ascetic” interpretation. The subject of this interpretation is the 
explanation in the Phaedo Socrates gives for what happens in the soul before and after 
philosophy takes possession of it and thus for why the philosopher lives in the unusual way 
he does with respect to experiences of pleasure and pain. Further, it is part of this 
interpretation that the conception of belief the character uses in his explanation is the one 
Michael Frede thinks the historical Socrates is likely to have held and the Stoics incorporated 
in their doctrine of practice. This gives the interpretation its name.1 
The ascetic interpretation, if it is correct, provides a reason to think the Stoics took 
inspiration for their doctrine of practice from the historical Socrates and his life through the 
                                                 
1  Woolf 2004: 98 introduces the “‘ascetic’ reading” for one of two interpretations he develops of how 
in the Phaedo Socrates understands what “it [is] to live, as far as possible, without the body.” (The 
other interpretation he calls the “‘evaluative’ reading”).  The interpretation I argue against shares the 
name and is similar in certain ways but is not a version of Woolf’s “‘ascetic’ reading”. 
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explanation in the Phaedo.2 It provides a reason to think they saw that he was represented as 
living with an indifference to the kinds of experiences of pleasure and pain that ordinarily are 
central to the way human beings live, that they concluded he lived this way to become “open 
to the truth” and to “come to have the right view of things”,3 and that they followed Socrates 
in this in their doctrine of practice. 
 This is an intriguing way to understand the history from Socrates to the Stoics, but 
the evidence for the ascetic interpretation is weak. Socrates’ explanation can be read so that 
it confirms the ascetic interpretation, but his explanation can also be read so that it is 
inconsistent with this interpretation. This alternative way to read Socrates’ explanation is the 
“Platonic” interpretation. This interpretation rejects the intellectualism that marks the 
conception of belief Frede suggests for the historical Socrates and the Stoics,4 but it fits the 
textual evidence at least as well as the ascetic interpretation.  
 
2. Frede’s Historical Socrates 
 
To understand the ascetic interpretation, it is necessary to understand how Frede 
thinks the historical Socrates thought about belief. He says that what we know or at least 
                                                 
2  A. A. Long, Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life.  Oxford University Press, 2002. Long 
2002 says that the language Epictetus uses and the way he contrasts mind and body shows that “[his] 
recollection of the Phaedo is certain” (158). In general, though, the evidence for the influence of 
Socratic textual sources on the Stoics is more difficult to assess. For discussion of the influence of 
the Phaedo, see Alesse 2015.  For the influence of the Platonic dialogues, see Alesse 2018. 
3  “[W]hat is at issue [in the Stoic division of ethics into a theoretical and practical part] is not just 
making one’s life consistent with one’s views, <…> but also arranging one’s life and one’s 
disposition in such a way that one is open to truth and can come to have the right view of things” 
(Frede 2000: 15). Cf. Frede 2000: 11. “[A] good life [according to Plato] will crucially involve, as 
part of the way one lives, contemplation of the truth. Practicing the right way to live will also be a 
means to enable the soul to free itself from the body, to see the truth, and to engage in the 
contemplation of truth”. 
4  Frede 2000: 12.  Cf. Michael Frede, A Free Will. Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, edited 
by A.A. Long, University of California Press, 2011. “The Stoics took themselves to be reverting to 
Socrates’ view [that, in what we are doing, we are entirely guided by our beliefs], as they saw it 
represented in Plato’s earlier dialogues, in particular, Plato’s Protagoras. There is no indication in 
these dialogues, down to and including the Phaedo, of a division of the soul. Even in the Phaedo the 
soul in its entirety seems to be an embodied reason. So the Stoics took the soul to be a reason” (32). 
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seem to know5 about him “strongly suggests” that he thought some beliefs are “embedded in 
the way we feel and behave”.  What we seem to know, according to Frede, is that “in spite of 
his extreme intellectualism—that is to say, his view that the way we act is completely 
determined by our beliefs, in particular our beliefs concerning the good and related 
matters6—Socrates’ life seems to have been characterized by a remarkable degree of 
asceticism”. Frede does not explain why, but he says this “strongly suggests” that Socrates 
“thought that it is not a matter of pure rational argument which beliefs we espouse and which 
we fail to espouse, but that, precisely because some of our beliefs are so deeply embedded in 
the way we feel and behave, our openness to their rational rejection or their rational 
acceptance, our openness to rational argument, also is a matter of our pattern of behavior and 
the control we have over our behavior”.7 
 Frede’s description of what the historical Socrates “thought” is compressed, but one 
way to supply some of the missing detail is to take him to mean that the historical Socrates 
thought that to have the knowledge one needs to live a good life, one must not only reason 
correctly but must also behave correctly. One must behave correctly because behaviors that 
make us “feel” certain ways can produce beliefs in the absence of reasoning, and some beliefs 
these behaviors produce and reinforce are inconsistent with living a good life. Since these 
beliefs are not “espoused” on the basis of “pure rational argument,” having a reason is not 
enough for someone to abandon these beliefs. One must also change the behaviors that 
constitute them because these beliefs and the control human beings have over them are “a 
matter of our pattern of behavior and the control we have over our behavior”.8 
 The argument for this interpretation of the historical Socrates is that if he did think 
about belief and the good life in this way, it would explain why he lived in the unusually 
ascetic way he did. Frede leaves his readers to supply most of the explanation,9 but it is not 
                                                 
5  Frede 2000: 9, Frede 1992: 204-205.  
6  Frede understands Socrates’ intellectualism to have its basis in the ontological thesis that desires 
are “beliefs of a certain kind” (Frede 2000: 10). 
7  Frede 2000: 9-10. 
8  For skepticism on philosophical grounds about this conception of belief in the Stoic doctrine of 
practice, see Brennan 2003: 278-279. 
9 Frede says only that the fact that Socrates lived in the ascetic way he did, even though he was 
convinced that his behavior was completely controlled by his beliefs, “strongly suggests” that he 
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too difficult to do. Socrates would think that as a result of behaviors in which human beings 
“feel” pleasure and pain, they typically try to arrange their lives so that they behave in more 
of the pleasurable ways and in fewer of the painful ways because the pleasure and pain they 
experience causes them to develop states that motivate them to behave in these ways. 
Socrates would think too that motivation requires desire and that the behavior these states 
motivate is habitual.10 This understanding of how human beings live is in itself relatively 
uncontroversial, but since he also accepted that “extreme intellectualism” is true, he drew the 
substantive conclusion that these states are or stem from “beliefs of a certain kind”11 that 
themselves are not held as a matter of reason. Moreover, Socrates realized that he had 
developed such beliefs and that they were inconsistent with living a good life as he had come 
to understand this life. So he changed his “pattern of behavior” to rid himself of these beliefs, 
and this change in his behavior changed his life so that it came to be “characterized by a 
remarkable degree of asceticism”. 
 
3. The Parts of the Explanation the Interpretations have in Common 
 
Now that the assumption about belief that informs the ascetic interpretation has been 
clarified, it remains to determine whether the acetic interpretation is more plausible than the 
Platonic interpretation. Since the two interpretations agree in outline on how to understand 
Socrates’ explanation, the first step is to set out this common ground the interpretations share. 
On both the ascetic and Platonic interpretation, to explain why the philosopher lives 
in the very unusual way he does, Socrates explains what happens in the soul before and after 
philosophy takes possession of it. To show why the philosopher lives this life, a life the non-
philosopher thinks is more like being dead than alive,12 Socrates explains what someone 
                                                 
thought that some beliefs are “embedded in the way we feel and behave” and thus that we do not 
“espouse” or “fail to espouse” these beliefs as “a matter of pure rational argument”. 
10 For discussion of habit in the Roman Stoics, see William O. Stephens, “The Roman Stoics on 
Habit”, A History of Habit: From Aristotle to Bourdieu, 37-65, edited by Tom Sparrow and Adam 
Hutchinson, Lexington Books, 2013. 
11  For this characterization, see note #6. 
12  Phaedo 65a4-6. Cf. Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.6.4. 
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realizes when philosophy takes possession of his soul. Further, he explains how on the basis 
of this information the philosopher changes his beliefs and his behavior with respect to 
experiences of pleasure and pain. 
Both interpretations take what the philosopher realizes to include an important fact 
about his existence.13 Socrates says that before philosophy takes possession of the soul, each 
pleasure and pain “fastens it to the body” so that it has “the same beliefs as the body and 
enjoys the same things (ὁμοδοξεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν)”.14 This, in turn, he 
says, forces the soul to adopt “the same ways and sustenance” as the body (83d5, 7-8, 8-9)15 
and thus to live a life that is not its own. Socrates makes these remarks in the context of his 
previous assertion that “lovers of knowledge16 recognize17 that when philosophy takes 
possession18 of the soul, it has been thoroughly bound and glued to the body” (82d9-e2). So 
it is clear that what the philosopher realizes about his existence is twofold. He realizes not 
only that (i) his past experiences of pleasure and pain have “fastened” his soul to his body 
but also that if he is to start living a good life as he now understands this life, (ii) he must 
take steps to stop living as he had been living before philosophy took possession of his soul.  
 Socrates’ discussion shows that he understands (i) in terms of something he has said 
is a “track” philosophers have discovered and think they should no longer follow. He says 
that “genuine philosophers” tell one another that “it looks as if some sort of track is leading 
us, together with our reason, astray” (66b2-4).19 He does not pause to explain what this 
                                                 
13 Cf. Robins 2003: 3. 
14  David Sedley & Alex Long, Plato, Meno and Phaedo.  Cambridge University Press, 2011. David 
Gallop, Plato – Phaedo, Oxford University Press, 1975. My translations are or follow the translations 
in Gallop 1975 and Sedley & Long 2011. For “same beliefs as the body and enjoys the same things”, 
the translation in Gallop 1975 is “sharing opinions and pleasures with the body”. 
15  Gallop 1975: “force to become of like character and nurture to it”. 
16  Plato draws no distinction between “lovers of knowledge” and “philosophers.” See Phaedo 82b10-
c1. See also Republic II.376b8-9. Cf. John Burnet, Plato’s Phaedo, Oxford University Press, 1911, 
38, 74, 77 and Ebrey 2017: note 13 on 5.  
17  Gallop 1975. Sedley & Long 2011: “are aware (γιγνώσκουσι)”. 
18  Gallop 1975: “when philosophy takes their soul in hand”. Cf. Burnet 1911: “παραλαβοῦσα, ‘taking 
in hand,’ as a doctor takes his patient in hand for treatment” (75). 
19  Gallop 1975. Sedley & Long 2011: “a sort of short cut may well be taking us with our reason 
towards the quarry in our inquiry”. Wilburn 2011 criticizes this translation as “rather graceless”, but 
there is also the question of interpretation. For discussion, see Harry 1909. Gallop 1975 follows Harry 
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“track” is, but he clearly thinks that it exists because “we possess the body” (66b5).20 Socrates 
explains that genuine philosophers think that their “soul is contaminated” by the body (66b5-
6), that they think that the body “fills us up with lusts and desires and fears and with all sorts 
of fancies and foolishness” (66c2-4), and that because genuine philosophers think in this way 
about “the body and its desires” (66c7-8), they do not “consort with or have dealings with 
the body other than what is absolutely necessary” (67a3-4).   
The point to notice in these remarks is that the philosopher realizes that he should 
abstain from certain “desires” he would not have resisted before philosophy took possession 
of his soul. These desires are expressions of “lusts,” “fears”, and “all sorts of fancies and 
foolishness” that arise in the soul in connection with the track the philosopher thinks he 
should not follow. The philosopher thinks this track is the path by which his body 
“contaminates” his soul because a soul that follows this track is “led, together with its reason, 
astray”. It is led to live a life proper to the body but not itself. 
Socrates adds more detail to what the philosopher realizes when he explains why “true 
philosophers abstain from all bodily desires, and stand firm without surrendering to them” 
(82c3-4). He says that true philosophers “believe that their actions must not oppose 
philosophy” (82d5).  He says they realize that when philosophy takes “possession of the soul” 
(82e1), it is imprisoned by the body and that the “ignorance” this imprisonment causes is 
reinforced through the satisfaction of “desire, so that the captive himself” aids in “his 
imprisonment” (82e4-7).  It is for this reason, he says, that “the soul of the true philosopher 
abstains from pleasures and desires and pains and fears, so far as it can, reckoning that when 
one feels intense pleasure or fear, pain or desire, one incurs harm from them not merely to 
the extent that might be supposed—by being ill, for example, or spending money to satisfy 
one’s desires—but one incurs the greatest and most extreme of all evils” (83b5-c2).  
                                                 
(note 10 on 227). John Burnet, Platonis Opera, Vol. 1. Tetralogias I-II, Oxford University Press, 
1900.  Burnet 1900 brackets μετὰ τοῦ λόγου. Burnet 1911 says the phrase is “a marginal note <…> 
that has got into the wrong place”. E. A. Duke, Platonis Opera, Vol. 1. Tetralogias I-II, edited by E. 
A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson, and J. C. G. Strachan.  Oxford University 
Press, 1995.  Duke 1995 leaves the phrase in the text. 
20  Gallop 1975 takes the “track” to be the body and supposes that philosophers “recognize that it 
side-tracks them in their quest for truth” (note 10 on 227).  
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The “track,” then, the philosopher has discovered is a way of thinking according to 
which someone who experiences “intense pleasure or fear, pain” is prevented from living a 
good life because in this thinking he is led to incur “the greatest and most extreme” evil. To 
make clearer what happens, Socrates asks Cebes whether it is true that “the soul of every 
man, when intensely pleased or pained at something, is forced to suppose21 that whatever 
affects it in this way is most clear and real, when it is not so; and such objects are especially 
things seen” (83c5-8). Cebes agrees without hesitation, and Socrates asks whether it is also 
true that “in this experience the soul is most thoroughly bound fast by the body” (83d1-2). 
This binding of soul to body is initially opaque enough that Cebes asks for explanation. 
Socrates says in reply that “each pleasure and pain fastens it to the body with a sort of rivet, 
pins it there, and makes it corporeal, so that the soul takes for real whatever the body declares 
to be so” (83d4-7) and that as result, because the soul has “the same beliefs as the body and 
enjoys the same things”, it is forced to have “the same ways and the same sustenance” (83d7-
9).  
So, according to both the ascetic and Platonic interpretation, the philosopher thinks 
he should not follow the “track” he has discovered because it leads to the “greatest and most 
extreme of all evils”. This evil results from the “ignorance” the soul reinforces if it follows 
the track in connection with its experiences of pleasure and pain. If the soul follows the track, 
it comes to believe that certain objects are involved in these experiences and that they are 
“most clear and real”, when in fact they are not. Moreover, because the soul also attributes a 
value to these experiences they do not possess,22 it acquires “the same ways and the same 
sustenance” as the body and thus acts on the basis of desires to pursue pleasures and avoid 
pains of the kinds it has experienced. In this way, the soul lives a life proper to the body but 
not itself and hence does not live a good life as the philosopher understands it.23 
                                                 
21  Gallop 1975. Sedley & Long 2011: “believe (ἡγεῖσθαι)”. 
22  Cf. Butler 2017: 88-91 and Ebrey 2017: 8. 
23  Although he does not talk about a “track”, Socrates seems to make a similar point in the Gorgias: 
that one who gets himself “accustomed from childhood on to like and dislike the same things” (ἐθίζειν 
αὑτὸν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἄχθεσθαι) as the tyrant “will have incurred the greatest evil, when his 
soul is corrupt and mutilated on account of his imitation” of the tyrant (510d6-7, 511a1-2). This is the 
translation in Donald Zeyl, Plato –  Gorgias, Hackett Publishing Company, 1987. Cf. Laws II.656b. 




4. The Ascetic Interpretation 
 
The ascetic and Platonic interpretations agree that the thinking that occurs when the 
soul follows the track is familiar enough to explain why Cebes accepts without hesitation that 
it occurs,24 but they disagree about what happens in the cognitive process in which 
experiences of pleasure and pain lead the soul to have “the same beliefs as the body and [to 
enjoy] the same things” as the body. They also disagree about what happens when to stop 
living as he had been living before philosophy took possession of his soul, “the soul of the 
true philosopher abstains from pleasures and desires and pains and fears, so far as it can”. 
Both interpretations understand this abstaining in the same general way. They agree that the 
philosopher resists the “desires” that arise with respect to experiences of “pleasure”, “pain”, 
of what one “fear[s]”, and so on, in order to remove the “rivets” that fasten his soul to his 
body, but since they disagree about what these “rivets” are and how they are driven into the 
soul, they disagree about what happens in the process in which the philosopher removes 
them. 
To begin to understand the side of the ascetic interpretation in this disagreement, it is 
useful to consider a familiar case in which someone forms a belief but later abandons it in 
the light of new information. Suppose, for example, that someone is looking at lines in a 
Müller-Lyer illusion and wonders whether they are the same length. One way to know is to 
use a ruler and to reason about the measurements, but this is not the only way. If someone 
looks at the lines, and is unaware of the illusion and has no other reason to withhold judgment, 
he will naturally form the belief that one line is longer. Once he is aware of the illusion, 
however, he will abandon this belief, as is rational. One line continues to look longer to him, 
but he does not believe it is because he knows the look is misleading.  
                                                 
24 William James, The Principles of Psychology, Volume II. Henry Holt and Company, 1918: “among 
all sensations, the most belief-compelling are those productive of pleasure or of pain. Locke expressly 
makes the pleasure- or pain-giving quality to be the ultimate human criterion of anything's reality” 
(306). James cites Essay IV.2.14 and IV.11.8, where Locke argues from within the empiricist tradition 
(which the character Socrates rejects (Phaedo 99b)) for knowledge of what exists. 
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Since this can appear true too for the philosopher and the beliefs he formed in terms 
of his experiences of pleasure and pain, it can be puzzling what abstaining from desires has 
to do with abandoning the beliefs he formed previously. When philosophy takes possession 
of his soul, he realizes that the way he had been forming beliefs is inconsistent with living a 
good life. He now understands that the soul has a good opposed to the body and that if he 
continues to form beliefs in terms of his experiences of pleasures and pains, he will have an 
incorrect view of reality and will live a life proper to his body but not to his soul. So once 
philosophy takes possession of his soul, he has the reason he needs to abandon the beliefs he 
formed previously. Abstaining seems to have no role to play.  
 The text too can suggest that when the philosopher abstains, it is not to rid himself of 
the beliefs he formed in terms of his experiences of pleasure and pain before he became a 
philosopher. Socrates has explained that when philosophy takes possession of the soul, the 
philosopher finds himself with “no leisure for philosophy” (66d2). He believes the forms are 
“most clear and real” and that his life is good to the extent he spends his time in contemplation 
of them, but he has trouble living this way because he is continually interrupted by desires to 
live as he did before philosophy took possession of his soul. This is why he abstains. His aim 
is not to abandon the beliefs he formed previously. He abandoned them when philosophy 
took possession of his soul. He abstains in an effort to prevent the desires to live as he did 
from arising and interrupting the leisure he needs for philosophy. 
 The ascetic interpretation, however, sees the matter differently. It takes this way of 
thinking about Socrates’ explanation of what happens in the soul to rest on a 
misunderstanding of the conception of belief he uses in his explanation. One might naturally 
think that someone abandons a belief simply by recognizing it is false, but if the character 
Socrates uses the conception of belief that Frede thinks the historical Socrates is likely to 
have held, then the philosopher cannot abandon some of the beliefs he has come to recognize 
as false without also changing “[his] pattern of behavior”.25   
                                                 
25 The philosopher does not control his behavior to rid himself of beliefs in Woolf’s “‘ascetic’ 
reading”, but other commentators seem to understand the philosopher in this way in their 
interpretations of Socrates’ explanation. See, for example, Butler 2012: 108, Butler 2017: 88, 99-100, 
Ebrey 2017: 7-8, and Butler 2019: 168-174.  For a bibliography, see Jones & Marechal 2019: notes 7 
and 8 on 97-98. 
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So, according to the ascetic interpretation, abstaining from the desires is how the 
philosopher abandons the beliefs he formed before philosophy took possession of his soul 
and thus how he stops living as he had been living. He formed these beliefs about what is 
good and bad when he attributed values to his experiences of pleasure and pain. These beliefs 
guided him before he became a philosopher. Moreover, on the ascetic interpretation, they 
continue to guide him now that philosophy has taken possession of his soul. He thinks the 
forms are most clear and real and that his life is good to the extent he lives in contemplation 
of them, but he remains “bound fast” to his old ways.   
Because the philosopher remains “bound fast” to his old ways, he is interrupted by 
the “body and its desires” when he tries to spend time in contemplation of the forms. On the 
ascetic interpretation, these desires arise because he continues to look for ways to engage in 
the activities he still believes are good and to avoid the activities he still believes are bad.  
Socrates explains that even “if we [philosophers] do get any leisure from [the body], and turn 
to pursuing some inquiry, once again it intrudes everywhere in our investigations, setting up 
a clamor and disturbance, and overwhelms us, so that the truth cannot be discerned because 
of it” (66d3-7). According to the ascetic interpretation, to prevent these desires from arising 
and thus to give himself the leisure he needs to live in contemplation of the forms, the 
philosopher realizes that he must rid himself of these beliefs he formed previously and now 
recognizes are false. On the ascetic interpretation, these beliefs are the “rivets” that prevent 
him from living a good life as he now understands it. Further, according to the ascetic 
interpretation, he realizes that he formed these beliefs in a kind of conditioning in terms of 
his previous experiences of pleasure and pain and thus that he can abandon them only by 
reconditioning himself.  
Since, as Socrates explains, “philosophy discerns the cunning of the prison [the body 
forms for the soul], how it is affected though desire” (82e5-6), one of the ways the 
philosopher reconditions himself is by resisting the desires that arise when he sees certain 
opportunities to live as he did before philosophy took possession of his soul. The soul of the 
philosopher, he says, “would not suppose that, its own release being a job for philosophy, 
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while philosophy is doing that it should of its own accord surrender itself for the pleasures 
and pains to bind it back inside [the body] again” (84a3-5).26 
This resistance to the “body and its desires” is common to both interpretations, but 
the ascetic interpretation understands it in a distinctive way. On the ascetic interpretation, the 
psychology is intellectualist. This has the consequence that the desires the philosopher resists 
have to be understood to be or to stem from “beliefs of a certain kind”. On the ascetic 
interpretation, he resists the desire that arises when he sees an opportunity to engage in an 
activity he came to believe and still believes is good on the basis of his past experiences of 
pleasure.27 If he resists the desire, and so does not experience the pleasure because he does 
not engage in the activity, he weakens the belief. As he weakens the belief by resisting the 
desires, he becomes less occupied with opportunities to engage in the activity and thus 
provides himself with some of the leisure he needs to live in contemplation of the forms. 
Socrates does not describe this resistance to desire in detail, but the explanation on 
both interpretations is that he sees no need to supply details because he has in mind the 
ordinary practices human beings use to change their habitual behaviors. Moreover, later in 
the Phaedo, in an objection to the theory that the soul exists as a kind of harmony, he lists 
exactly the sort of ordinary practices one should expect. He suggests, and Simmias 
immediately agrees, that the soul opposes “bodily passions,” such as thirst and hunger, “in 
all kinds of ways, sometimes disciplining more harshly and painfully with gymnastics and 
medicine, sometimes more mildly, now threatening and now admonishing, conversing with 
our appetites and passions and fears, as if with a separate thing” (94b7, d2-6).28  
Given intellectualism, it is possible too to see more evidence that the philosopher 
reconditions himself so that he no longer has the beliefs about what is good and bad that he 
formed on the basis of his experience of pleasure and pain. After Socrates says the 
philosopher thinks his soul is “contaminated” by the body, he identifies “purification” with 
the “habituating (ἐθίσαι) of [the soul] to assembling and gathering itself from every part of 
                                                 
26  Sedley & Long 2011. Gallop 1975: “would not think that while philosophy should release it, yet 
on being released, it should of itself surrender to the pleasures and pains, to bind it to the body once 
again”. 
27  Cf. Gorgias 492d-494a. 
28  For argument Plato thinks such personification is a way to control behavior, see Kamtekar 2006. 
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the body, alone by itself, and to living alone by itself as far as it can” (67c5-9).29 The 
implication is that to purify himself so he can live a good life, the philosopher must get used 
to living a new way. On the ascetic interpretation, the philosopher must get used to resisting 
the desires that are or stem from the beliefs about what is good and bad he formed before 
philosophy took possession of his soul. Resisting these desires weakens the beliefs and thus 
loosens the “rivets” his previous experience of pleasure and pain drove into his soul. In this 
resistance, the philosopher aims to live in a way that he is as free as possible from “body and 
its desires” and thus to live in a way that he has the leisure he needs to live his life in 
contemplation of the forms. 
When Socrates returns to the need for habituation, he “imagines” (81b1)30 the 
consequences that follow in death for those who do not properly retrain their souls. He says 
that when such a soul departs in death, it is “impure, because it has always been with the 
body, has served and loved it, and been so bewitched by it, by its passions and pleasures” 
(81b1-4). He explains that such a soul does not enter the “presence of the good and wise god” 
(80d7).  Instead, it “is weighed down, and dragged back into the region of the seen” (81c10),31 
and it “roams among tombs” (81d1) until it enters a body with the “character” (ἤθη) the 
human being had in life (81e3). Socrates explains that “[t]hose who have cultivated32 
gluttony, for example, and lechery, and drunkenness, and have taken no pains to avoid them, 
are likely to enter the forms of donkeys and animals of that sort” (81e6-82a1). 
 Socrates does not say why he helps Cebes imagine the consequences that follow in 
death for someone whose soul is not habituated properly,33 but given the ascetic 
                                                 
29  Cf. Harold Fowler, Plato, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus. Harvard University Press, 
1914: “the purification consists in <…> teaching the soul the habit of <…>”.   
 
30  Gallop 1975: “I imagine (οἶμαι)”. Sedley & Long 2011: “I mean”. 
31  Cf. Republic VII.519a-b. 
32  Gallop 1975. Sedley & Long 2011: “practiced” (μεμελετηκότας).  
33  Daniel C. Russell, Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life. Oxford University Press, 2005. Russell 
2005: 99 thinks this imagery is “occult” and that it is “not clear what we should make” of it.  Jones 
& Marechal 2019: 96 explain that “Socrates tells us (surely playfully)” that “souls [that have not 
purified themselves from the body] are so bodily that they sink to earth and wonder around graveyards 
as shadowy figures that are occasionally seen by the living”. 
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interpretation, it is plausible to take his intention in part to illustrate another step the 
philosopher can take to loosen the “rivets” that were put in place before philosophy took 
possession of his soul. One way is to resist the desires that arise when he sees opportunities 
to engage in the activities he came to and still believes are good on the basis of his past 
experiences of pleasure, but Socrates seems to think there is another way too. He can weaken 
these beliefs by imagining the negative consequences of engaging in the activities.   
 On the ascetic interpretation, the question and answer sequence in 64d-65a indicates 
the beliefs the philosopher possesses at the end of the reconditioning process. Socrates asks 
Simmias whether it is fitting for the philosopher to be “eager” (64d2) about the pleasures of 
food, drink, and sex. He replies it is not, and Socrates extends the inquiry to other “services 
to the body” (64d8), such as “having fine clothes and shoes” (64d9-10).34 He asks whether 
the philosopher prizes “them highly, or does he disdain them, except in so far as he is 
absolutely compelled to share in them” (64d11-e1).35 Simmias replies that he “disdains” 
them. Socrates asks whether “such a man’s concern is not for the body, and that, as far as he 
can, he stands apart from it and is turned to his soul” (64e4-6). Simmias gives the expected 
answer, and Socrates concludes that “in matters like these the philosopher differs from other 
men in releasing his soul, as far as possible, from its association with the body” (64e8-65a2). 
 Moreover, on the ascetic interpretation, this exchange suggests that the philosopher 
reconditions himself to replace his beliefs with the sort of beliefs the historical Socrates 
seems to have had. So, for example, if the philosopher previously believed the pleasures of 
wearing “fine clothes and shoes” are good, then after philosophy takes possession of his soul, 
he reconditions himself so that he no longer has this belief. Similarly, if he had the belief that 
the pleasures of the table are good, he reconditions himself so that he no longer has this belief. 
The philosopher must eat and drink and protect himself from the elements, but he 
reconditions himself so his beliefs are for what maintains his life. 
 Both interpretations take this reconditioning to result in a life in which Socrates thinks 
one has the virtues of character, but the ascetic interpretation understands this in terms of 
                                                 
34  Cf. Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.6.2. 
35  Gallop 1975. Sedley & Long 2011: “values them, or attaches no value to them except in so far as 
he must absolutely take an interest in them”. 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy, vol. 14 issue 2, 2020.  
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i2p53-75 
66 
intellectualism. It is a mistake, Socrates says, to exchange “pleasures for pleasures, pains for 
pains, fear or fear, greater for lesser ones, like coins” (69a7-9). He does not explain how these 
states are like “coins”, but the suggestion is that the exchange treats pleasure and pain as 
commensurable and aims to maximize the overall experience of pleasure minus pain. Hence 
it is a mistake, for example, to give up the pleasures of the table for the pleasures of health 
because over time the pleasures of the table bring more pain than pleasure.36 On the ascetic 
interpretation, the correct exchange is for the correct beliefs about good and bad that 
constitute “wisdom” (69a10).37 Socrates thinks that this exchange results in “courage, 
temperance, justice, and in sum true virtue” (69b2-3), that true “temperance, justice, and 
courage are a kind of purification” (69c1-2)38, that engaging in this purification is what those 
“who have pursued philosophy correctly” (69d2) have done, and that he has striven to be 
among them (69d2-4). 
5. The Platonic Interpretation 
 
At this point it is clear that Socrates’ explanation can be read so it that confirms the 
ascetic interpretation, but it is also clear that this reading is surprising on philosophical 
grounds. According to this interpretation, experiences of pleasure and pain give the 
philosopher beliefs he later recognizes as false when philosophy takes possession of his soul. 
This recognition, though, is not enough for him to abandon these beliefs because the behavior 
that constitutes them is habitual. To abandon them, he must also control his behavior so that 
he stops acting on desires for the sorts of experiences of pleasure and pain that gave him 
these beliefs before philosophy took possession of his soul. This interpretation might be 
correct, but there must be enough evidence to rule out the Platonic interpretation. 
At 83c5, Socrates does say that when “the soul of every man” experiences intense 
pleasure or pain, it is “forced” to suppose that what affects it in this way is “most clear and 
                                                 
36  Cf. Burnet 1911: 42. 
37  Cf. Burnet 1911: 43. “[We are supposed] to buy wisdom with pleasures, &c”. For discussion of the 
exchange metaphor, see Weiss 1987 and Russell 2005: 94-97. 
38  “The other so-called virtues of the soul seem very close to the body, for they do not really exist 
before, but are added later by habit and practice” (Republic VII.518d9-e2). 
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real”.39  It is also true that he says this as part of an explanation of why the “soul of the true 
philosopher abstains from pleasures and desires and pains and fears, so far as it can”, but 
these remarks are part of his account of what happens before and after philosophy takes 
possession of the soul. Socrates does not say “the soul of every man at every time”. When he 
says “the soul of every man”, he is explaining what happens before philosophy takes 
possession of the soul and thus what is true before the soul realizes that the forms are most 
clear and real and that the good life is a life of contemplating the forms. So it is natural to 
take him to mean that when the soul experiences pleasure and pain before philosophy has 
taken possession of it, the soul accepts certain propositions it later rejects once philosophy 
has taken possession of it. The soul is “forced” to accept these propositions before philosophy 
takes possession of it because at this point in its imprisonment it lacks an alternative. Before 
philosophy takes possession of the soul, it does not know what is most clear and real and 
what life is the good life.  
So what Socrates says at 83c5 about the “soul of every man” allows that when 
philosophy takes possession of his soul, the philosopher abandons the belief about what is 
“most clear and real” that he formed before philosophy took possession of his soul. This is 
true even if, contrary to what I have argued, Socrates thinks that experiences of pleasure and 
pain can force the philosopher to form a false belief about what is most clear and real after 
philosophy has taken possession of his soul.40 As long as the philosopher is not experiencing 
pleasure or pain when philosophy takes possession of his soul, he can abandon his false belief 
about reality because he now recognizes that it is false. He now realizes that the forms are 
most clear and real and that the good life is the life of contemplation. 
Further, even the ascetic interpretation can take Socrates to think both that the 
philosopher abandons this false belief when philosophy takes possession of his soul and that 
he does not form it again if he experiences pleasure or pain. The heart of the disagreement 
                                                 
39  Butler 2012 stresses the importance of these remarks for his interpretation. “Since the result is 
inevitable and necessary, the philosopher must stay away from such feelings and their causes” (107). 
40 At Phaedo 60b3-4, as he straightened his leg and gave it a hard rub, Socrates reports having the 
experience “people call pleasure”. He finds it surprising how this experience is related to its opposite, 
but he gives no indication that he thinks that it has forced him to have a belief about what “most clear 
and real”. The reason, presumably, is that he is a philosopher and so knows better than to follow the 
“track” that philosophers have discovered and think they should not follow. 
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between the ascetic and Platonic interpretation is over what Socrates thinks goes on when 
“the soul of the true philosopher abstains from pleasures and desires and pains and fears” to 
solve the problem the “body and its desires” poses for his leisure. The ascetic interpretation 
takes the psychology to be intellectualist. The philosopher has the problem of the “body and 
its desires” after philosophy has taken possession of his soul because he still has the beliefs 
about what is good and bad he formed on the basis of his experiences of pleasure and pain 
before philosophy took possession of his soul. If he resists the desires that arise to pursue and 
avoid the pleasures and pains of the kind he experienced previously, he does not experience 
the pleasure or pain. This weakens the beliefs about what is good and bad he formed 
previously because it deprives the soul of the experiences necessary to sustain them. Thus, 
by resisting the desires and imagining the negative consequences, the philosopher rids 
himself of the beliefs he formed and thus solves the problem the “body and its desires” poses 
for the leisure he needs for contemplation.  
Intellectualism, however, is not something Socrates indicates that he accepts. In his 
explanation of what happens before and after philosophy takes possession of the soul, he uses 
the ordinary and familiar language of the mind in a way that gives no indication he thinks 
that intellectualism is true. Moreover, without intellectualism as a premise, it is possible to 
understand his explanation so that the philosopher “abstains” to change his likings and 
dislikings, not his beliefs about what is good and bad. Recall that in his explanation Socrates 
says that before philosophy takes possession of the soul, each pleasure and pain “fastens it to 
the body” in such a way that it has both “the same beliefs as the body” and “enjoys the same 
things” as the body. A soul that enjoys things has likings and dislikings, just as a soul that 
believes things has beliefs. So it is possible the point Socrates makes in these remarks is that 
before philosophy takes possession of it, experiences of pleasure and pain fasten it to the 
body by giving it beliefs and likings and dislikings that force it to live a life proper to the 
body.41  
                                                 
41  Woolf 2004: 120-121 seems to think that Socrates recognizes a distinction between “beliefs” and 
“enjoyments of the body” and that the latter might be a problem “abstention” is intended to solve, but 
he does not explain the distinction or develop an interpretation in terms of it. 
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One reason to think this is his point is that over time as human beings experience 
pleasure or pain, especially intense pleasure or pain, it is a matter of common thought that 
they develop likings and dislikings for the objects of the experiences. As, for example, 
someone gains experience in eating different kinds of foods, he naturally develops likings for 
some and dislikings for others. Such likings and dislikings are not beliefs about what is good 
and bad. They are intentional states whose contents are how much one likes or dislikes 
something, such as eating a kind of “food,” drinking a kind of “drink”, or engaging in a kind 
of “sex” (64d3, 64d4, 64d6).42 So, on the Platonic interpretation, because the soul had various 
pleasurable and painful experiences before philosophy took possession of it, the soul 
developed a set of likings and dislikings that guide it in the choices it makes. 
If this is right, the rest of Socrates’ explanation goes through almost exactly as it does 
on the ascetic interpretation. When philosophy takes possession of his soul, the philosopher 
realizes that he previously formed false beliefs when he experienced pleasure and pain. At 
this point in Socrates’ explanation, however, contrary to the ascetic interpretation, the 
philosopher abandons all of these beliefs that he formed previously, as is rational, because he 
now knows that the forms are most clear and real and that his life is good to the extent he 
spends his time in contemplation of them.  
This alone, though, does not solve the problem of the “body and its desires”. On the 
Platonic interpretation, these desires do not continue to arise from beliefs the philosopher 
formed on the basis of his past experiences of pleasure and pain. Instead, they arise from the 
likings and dislikings he developed on the basis of his past experiences of pleasure and pain. 
The philosopher abandoned the beliefs when philosophy took possession of his soul, but 
because the likings and dislikings he developed continue to guide his life, the philosopher 
needs to recondition himself to change the likings and dislikings and thus to remove the 
remaining “rivets” that fasten him to his old ways. 
The methods the philosopher uses are the same as in the ascetic interpretation. If he 
resists the desire that arises when he sees an opportunity to engage in an activity he came to 
                                                 
42  For a theoretical discussion of likings and dislikings, and how these intentional states fit into human 
cognition and rationality more generally, see John Pollock, Thinking about Acting – Logical 
Foundations for Rational Decision Making, Oxford University Press, 2006, 38-66. 
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like through past experiences of pleasure, and so does not experience the pleasure because 
he does not engage in the activity, the liking diminishes because it is not reinforced. In his 
resisting the desires and in his imagining negative consequences43 of the activities, the 
philosopher aims for a life of the sort the historical Socrates seems to have lived because the 
philosopher thinks that this life has the virtues of character necessary for the leisure required 
to live in contemplation of the forms.44  In this life, he has replaced the likings and dislikings 
he developed before philosophy took possession of his soul with new ones and thus has 
solved the problem of the “body and its desires” to the extent possible while he is alive. Now 
desires no longer arise for the pleasures of “fine clothes and shoes” and other such things that 
dominated his life before philosophy took possession of his soul.45 He thus lives in a way 
that appears to non-philosophers to reflect an indifference to experiences of pleasure and 
pain. 
 So the ascetic interpretation is not the only possible way to read Socrates’ explanation 
of what happens in the soul before and after philosophy takes possession of it. It is also 
possible to read the explanation so that he uses a distinction between beliefs, on the one hand, 
and likings and dislikings, on the other. On this Platonic interpretation, the character does not 
                                                 
43 Cf. the “Tips From Former Smokers” campaign. To help smokers break the habit and to prevent 
non-smokers from acquiring it, the campaign features in graphic images the horrific “stories of former 
smokers living with smoking-related diseases and disabilities and the toll these conditions have taken 
on them” (https://www.cdc.gov/ tobacco/campaign/tips/about/index.html). The campaign intends 
these images to help smokers change their behavior in a way belief in the evidence that smoking 
contributes to various diseases does not. The belief or even the knowledge that smoking is bad for 
them is not itself enough for them to stop. They must recondition themselves, and the campaign uses 
the gruesome images in their ads to “communicate in a very human way” that smoking is bad for 
one’s health (https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/campaign/tips/about/faq/ campaign-faq.html). 
44  Cf. Jones & Marechal 2019.  “[T]he goal is to clear as much space as possible for the pursuit of 
knowledge” (90) and “to maintain our full attention on the pursuit of knowledge” (92). 
45  In the Symposium, Alcibiades reports that during the campaign at Potidaea, when the cold sent 
others to “wrap themselves in an amazing number of garments and put on shoes and tie up their feet 
in felt and sheepskins,” Socrates went out in the clothes he always wore (220a-b). This suggests that 
Socrates, as a philosopher, has taken control of his life in such a way that he does not have the desire 
that drove his fellow soldiers to take such elaborate precautions to avoid the cold. Alcibiades also 
reports that Socrates once stood at dawn thinking and continued thinking through the night (220c-d). 
This too suggests that for Socrates, as a philosopher, desires that would arise in many do not arise in 
him. He has solved the problem of the “body and its desires” to give himself leisure for philosophy. 
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have the conception of belief that some commentators seem to think and that Frede suggests 
for historical Socrates. He does think some experiences can produce beliefs in the absence of 
reasoning.46 This can happen with experiences of pleasure and pain. Over time, when 
someone experiences pleasure and pain, he develops certain likings and dislikings. These 
likings and dislikings are not beliefs, but if someone has no reason to think otherwise, it is 
rational for him to form beliefs both about the reality of the objects he takes to be involved 
in the experiences he likes or dislikes and about the value of these experiences.     
 It is not true, however, to use Frede’s words to express the point, that these beliefs are 
immune to “pure rational argument”. When philosophy takes possession of his soul, the 
philosopher rejects the beliefs he formed previously when he experienced pleasure and pain. 
He realizes that these beliefs are false and thus he abandons them as rationality requires, but 
if he is to have the leisure necessary to live in contemplation of the forms, he knows he must 
also change the likings and dislikings he has developed. It is these likings and dislikings, not 
the beliefs he formed, that are not revisable in argument alone. He realizes he acquired them 
in a kind of conative conditioning from his experiences of pleasure and pain, and so he knows 
that he must recondition himself to change them. 
 The ascetic interpretation, then, has a competitor. In this competing Platonic 
interpretation of what happens in the soul, the conception of belief Frede suggests for the 
historical Socrates is not part of the explanation for the ascetic life that the character Socrates 
associates with the philosopher. This interpretation of the explanation is possible because the 
psychology in the Platonic interpretation is not intellectualist. Without this premise, it is 
possible to explain the “remarkable degree of asceticism” that characterizes the life of the 
philosopher in terms of what, on philosophical grounds, can seem to be a more plausible 
conception of belief than the one Frede suggests for the historical Socrates. Intellectualism 
collapses the distinction between beliefs and likings and dislikings. This, in turn, forces one 
to think that if, on the basis of their experiences of pleasure and pain, human beings develop 
states that motivate certain habitual behaviors, then some beliefs and the control human 
                                                 
46  Cf. Christopher Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast. His Later Ethics and Politics. Oxford University 
Press, 2002, 25-26. See also Kamtekar 2006: 171-172. 
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beings have over them are “a matter of our pattern of behavior and the control we have over 
our behavior”. 
It is conceivable of course that the ascetic interpretation is the more plausible 
interpretation, but to demonstrate that it is, the argument must be more than that in the Phaedo 
Socrates accepts intellectualism because he does not argue that the soul has a rational and 
two non-rational parts like the character does in the Republic. In the Republic, the character 
has a reason to give this argument. He wants to show that just as a certain arrangement of the 
three parts of a city constitutes justice in a city, so too a certain arrangement of the three parts 
of a soul constitutes justice in a soul. In the Phaedo, since Socrates does not have this reason, 
it is not surprising he does not give this argument. 
 Even if this is right, one might still argue that it is telling against the Platonic 
interpretation that Socrates does not clearly indicate that the psychology in his explanation 
of what happens in the soul is not intellectualist. One might think that Plato understood that 
the historical Socrates lived as he did because he thought some beliefs are a matter of “our 
pattern of behavior”. So, in the Phaedo, when the character Socrates explains why the 
philosopher lives as he does, one might think that Plato would make him indicate any 
departure from the conception of belief the historical Socrates held. 
 To this, there are two responses. First of all, it is possible that Socrates does indicate 
that the psychology in his explanation is not intellectualist. This is one way to read his claim 
that before philosophy takes possession of soul, each pleasure and pain “fastens it to the 
body” in such a way that it has “the same beliefs as the body” and that “it enjoys the same 
things” as the body. It is true that he does not interrupt his discussion to explain that the 
distinction he has in mind is between beliefs, on the one hand, and likings and dislikings, on 
the other, and that this distinction has the consequence that the psychology he accepts is not 
intellectualist. This indication, then, would not be as obvious as the argument for the parts of 
the soul in the Republic, but it may be in the text nevertheless.   
Secondly, there is nothing to show that Plato was concerned that readers of the Phaedo 
correctly understand what the historical Socrates thought. It is possible that his aim was 
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philosophical, not historical.47 If this is right, then when Plato makes the character Socrates 
explain what happens in the soul before and after philosophy takes possession of it, his aim 
is not to help his readers understand why the historical Socrates lived in the way he did. His 
aim is to work out the significance that the “remarkable degree of asceticism” in the historical 
Socrates’ life has for the Platonic conception of the good life in terms of the contemplation 
of the forms. Plato need not have thought that he had to work out this significance in terms 
of the truth of intellectualism or that he needs to make the character Socrates explicitly say 




So although the ascetic interpretation is possible and connects the historical Socrates 
to the Stoics in an intriguing way, the evidence is too weak to rule out the Platonic 
interpretation. The ascetic interpretation requires that the psychology in Socrates’ explanation 
in the Phaedo is intellectualist. Socrates, however, does not tell or ever indicate to his 
interlocutors that the psychology is intellectualist, and it is unnecessary to think that Plato 
would have felt compelled to make him inform his interlocutors if he did not accept 
intellectualism. Further, there is a straightforward way to understand Socrates’ explanation 
of what happens in the soul in terms of a psychology that is not intellectualist. This is the 
Platonic interpretation. On this interpretation of his explanation, Socrates uses a distinction 
between beliefs and likings and dislikings. If this is right, then in the Phaedo the character 
                                                 
47 Long 1998: 119 endorses this general view of how to understand the dialogues. “Socrates is 
generally the vehicle or personified representation of his author’s methodology and philosophical 
ideals. <…> [And in] using Socrates as his philosophical vehicle, Plato is also commenting on and 
interpreting the significance for philosophy of Socrates’ life”. Cf. Matthews 2009: 440. 
48 Butler 2019: 165 maintains that “[i]f it were possible for concurrently held beliefs to be overridden 
by bodily desires, we would expect Socrates to mention this possibility both because it would 
constitute an obvious threat to philosophical practice and because it would fit naturally within the 
theme of the imprisoning power of bodily desires.”  It is unclear, though, why the reader should expect 
Socrates to interrupt his discussion to “mention” the “obvious”. Rather, the argument must be that to 
prevent readers from misunderstanding the explanation of what happens in the soul, Plato would make 
the character Socrates say that intellectualism is false because Plato thinks that they expect the 
character to think intellectualism is true. It may be that many modern readers do have this expectation 
about Socrates in the Phaedo, but I doubt there is justification for this expectation in the text. 
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Socrates does not have the conception of belief Michael Frede thinks that the historical 
Socrates is likely to have held and the Stoics much later incorporated in their doctrine of 
practice. It does not follow that Frede is wrong about the historical Socrates and the Stoics, 
but it does follow that Socrates’s explanation in the Phaedo is not strong evidence for Frede’s 
interpretation.49 
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